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Abstract : Railway system is a socio-technical system because the operation of such system also
heavily relies on the management of human activities and operating procedures in the organisation, as
well as the execution of technical subsystems. Safety of these systems therefore is more than just
about engineering their technical subsystems. The latest approach from systems engineering considers
that an accident is due to inadequate controlled interactions in the system and is usually a dynamic
event chain started from the activation of a hazard and culminated in a complex process of sequential
and concurrent events until the system is eventually out of control. Meanwhile the analysis of these
systems’s safety becomes much harder when simply applying the traditional techniques of safety
assessment. It is because, first of all, a social-technical system consists of a lot of complex and
non-linear interactions, traditional techniques show their limits when analysing complex systems. And
secondly, the safety of a social-technical system requires a system perspective, which should take all
the behaviours (desired and undesired but predicted) of a system as a whole in the context of its
environment. To capture the information needed, the models for these analyses (i.e., fault tree and
FMEA table) will become too complex to have a systemic view of each individual causal factor. In
this paper, we proposed an approach based on system thinking and system dynamics to analyse the
safety of a social-technical system. The case study of a tram accident is simple enough for the purpose
of demonstrating its feasibility and benefits. The comparison with fault tree analysis was conducted,
but it was not for the evaluation of our approach. The real evaluation comes from the extensive
applications in real world.
Keywords: Socio-technical systems; railway system; safety analysis; system engineering; hybrid
system dynamics
1 Introduction
A safety-critical system is a class of engineered
systems that may pose significant safety risks to
its operators, the public and the environment.
The development of these systems demands a
rigorous process of assessment and assurance to
demonstrate that risks to the system’s safety,
even if some components fail, are mitigated to
an acceptable level. However, significant
changes have occurred in the types of systems to
be built today and the context in which they are
being built (Levenson, 2004). These changes to
the system have exposed the limits of traditional
safety engineering.
System safety somehow is more than just
about engineering a technical system. The
concerns of system safety have already extended
beyond the boundary from a technical
(computer-based) system to include things such
as social and managerial processes. There is
some explicit evidence to support this view. A
recent tram accident involved a point (switch)
moving under a tram (RAIB, 2012). Although
rigorous hazard and safety assessment had been
undertaken for the technical systems, the hazard
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was “missed” apparently at least in part because
it arose out of the complex interactions,
including those between the technical systems
and social systems in the entire tram control
system. Operation of modern safety critical
systems, like a rail traffic management system,
involved management of human activities and
processes, as well as executions of technical
systems, thus the systems are often referred as
socio-technical systems. The term
“socio-technical” emphasises the
interconnections of “social” and “technical”
elements in the system. The fundamental
ideas/principles of a socio-technical approach
are:
1) interactions of social and technical factors
create the decisive conditions for successful (or
unsuccessful) behaviours of the entire system.
These interactions are comprised partly of linear
causal relationships, which are normally
specified and engineered, for example in various
operational procedure. They also increase
“non-linear”, complex, even unpredictable
relationships, which can lead to emergent
properties. An inevitable consequence of
considering social components as well as
technical components when analysing a system
(i.e, taking a socio-technical approach) is that
these social components do not necessarily
behave like the technical, people are not
machines, paradoxically, with growing
complexity and interdependence even the
technical components can start to exhibit
non-linear behaviour.
2) optimisations of either social or far more
commonly the technical components tends to
increase not only the quantity of unpredictable,
“un-designed”, non-linear relationships, but
those relationships that are actually injurious to
the system's performance. Safety is a system
property that high reliability of technical
components is neither necessary nor sufficient
for system safety. And, there is growing
evidence that accidents in socio-technical
systems usually have multiple causal factors, in
the form of an inter-connected network of events,
rather than a simple cause-effect chain.
Safety engineering techniques are traditionally
designed based on an assumption that most
accidents occur from the chance simultaneous
occurrence of random events. However, system’s
operation is not static. Rather than accidents
being a chance occurrence of multiple
independent events, they tend to involve a
migration to a state of increasing risk over time
(Rasmussen, 1997). The traditional techniques
suffered from the limitation of assuming each
accident as a static chain of events waiting to
happen. It is necessary, therefore, to establish a
systematic approach so that the trend of the
propagation of safety risks, which can span
multiple technical systems, human activities and
organisational processes, can be systematically
analysed in an integrated assessment.
In this paper, we adapt system dynamics and
system archetypes from systems engineering,
and propose a method to analyse the safety of
socio-technical systems. The rest of paper is
structured as follow. In section 2, we will brief
review the approaches of safety assessment and
the challenges to the safety of socio-technical
systems. In section 3, we introduce the
modelling technique used in the proposed
model-based safety assessment and our proposed
approach. Section 5 is about the case study.
2 Systems thinking in safety
analysis
The heart of system safety analysis is hazard
analysis, and it is essential in hazard analysis
that causes of each identified hazard are
thoroughly analysed by using techniques such as
fault tree analysis (FTA). After the cause
analysis, recommended solutions which can
effectively reduce the risk of each hazard are
often documented in the report of hazard
analysis (e.g., hazard log). However, safety is a
system property. Modern safety critical systems
consist of many nonlinear, counterintuitive and
dynamic “cause-and-consequence” relationships,
especially when taking social subsystems into
consideration. Sometimes it could be found that
the solution to one hazard might have some side
effects to the solutions of others, therefore the
fundamental solution to the safety of the overall
system could have been overlooked. Thus, it is
necessary to introduce systems thinking into
hazard analysis, more broadly system safety
engineering. Since systems thinking is a
framework for seeing interrelationships rather
than individual pieces, for seeing patterns of
change rather than static “snapshots”, it is
reasonable to believe the solution to the safety of
modern social-technical system comes from
systems engineering.
The safety assessment can be seen as a
process of:
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1) to describe the system;
2) to identify hazards;
3) to analyse consequences of each hazard;
4) to analyse the causes of each hazard;
5) to evaluate risk;
6) to propose mitigation of risk; after all
hazards have been analysed then
7) to analyse the residual risk; and
8) to document the results of whole safety
assessment.
The process is shown in Fig 1.
Fig. 1 Process of safety assessment
Hazard is a different concept with failure,
actually it is much broader term; it is an existing
or potential set of circumstances and actions that
can transform an activity involving a hazardous
condition into an accident. A hazard can be
considered as a dormant/potential harm which is
present in one form or another within the system
or its environment.
Taking the hazard analysis of the track circuit
as an example, a track circuit is a device
mounted on the track-side to detect if a
particular section of track is occupied by train. It
feeds safety data to the train control system,
usually automatic train control (ATC) system in
the application of a metro system. Table 1 is a
section of the hazard assessment of a track
circuit.
In the table, the hazardous (undesirable) event
is that a train has been lost in the ATC system,
which actually means that the ATC system does
not know the position of a train (more
technically a section of tracks are physically
occupied by a train but it says not in the ATC
system). Because the ATC system does not
know the position of the train, the speed of the
following train would not be safely controlled.
The worst scenario would be the following train
collides into the back of the leading train, which
may cause multiple fatalities/injures, or stoppage
of service. The reasons for the “lost” can be
identified that either due to either environmental
interferences, or faults on track circuit device
itself or data communication cable connected to
the device.
During the analysis, safety engineers always
ask themselves “does it currently (not) happen
if something A happens?” or “how likely it will
happen if something A happens?” The answers
to these questions will help identifying the
causes and consequences. However, it is hard to
identify the causal relationships by answering
those questions because a lot of dependencies in
a social-technical system are not as simple as
Boolean relationships.
Table 2 is a summary of the characteristics of
the majority of dependencies in the different
parts of a social-technical system. To help the
identification of the causal dependencies in the
system, questions like “does this happen if
something else happen?”, but also question “will
this positively/negatively change the situation of
something else?” will be asked more often.
The traditional analytical techniques, for
example FTA, are designed to deal with the
Boolean relationships, and limited to analyse
those complex and non-linear dependencies.
As summarised in Table 3, there is a need to
have a “more” capable technique/approach for
the hazard analysis. By label it “more” capable,
we request the new approach should be able to
capture the information necessary to the safety
of a social-technical system, represent all the
essential dependencies in the system in a clear
manner, and then examine/identify the
confliction/inadequate dependencies in the
system model/models. In addition, the approach
should base on systems thinking since it is a
framework for seeing interrelationships rather
than individual pieces, so that the approach is
able to provide capability for balancing overall
impacts to the system safety rather than the
effect from individual measures.
3 Hybrid System Dynamics Safety
Model
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System dynamics (Maani, 2007) provides a
framework for dealing with dynamic
complexity, where cause and effect are not
obviously related. The additional benefits from
system dynamics are models of system dynamics
are formal and can be “executed”. The models
and their simulations will help to capture
complex dynamics of behaviours of a
socio-technical system and to understand the
safety concerns of overall system.
Inherited from the original system dynamics
model, the extension will not be complicated.
The only thing needed to anlayse safety of
socio-technical systems (as listed in Table 3) is
to append the capability to model the Boolean
relationship.
The three basic elements of system dynamics
model, shown in Fig. 2, are positive/reinforcing
feedback, negative/balancing feedback, and
delays. In order to have an ability to capture
and analyse the Boolean dependencies in the
technical system, which is the core of a
social-technical system, the system dynamics
model could be extended by adding symbols
b/b+ and b- (b means Boolean relation).
Fig. 2 Dependencies in hybrid system
dynamics model
Similar to the elements in original system
dynamic model, if two things have a
“cause-and-effect” relationship, more precisely
thing X is a sufficient condition for thing Y,
they are connected by a curly arrow. If the
appearance of one thing (the “cause”) will result
the emergence of the other thing (the “effect”),
then the connection is indicated by “b” or “b+”
at the head of arrow; And if the appearance of
the cause will eliminate the existence of the
“effect”, then the connection is indicated by
“b-” at the head of arrow.
4 Case study
The case study is to demonstrate how the hybrid
system dynamics model can help the safety
assessment of a tram system – the tram system at
East Croydon station.
4.1 Overall system description
East Croydon station is one of 38 stops in the
line of regional tram service, provided by
Tramlink since May 2000. Trams approaching
East Croydon tram stop from the east use a
street-running section of double track. There are
two running lines divide to serve three platforms
at East Croydon. Platform 1 serves eastbound
trams, platform 3 westbound trams, and platform
2 serves trams travelling in either direction
depending on the operating mode set by the
signalling system.
The operation of tram service at East Croydon
station is a socio-technical system: a technical
system, including the signalling system in the
kernel; and operational rules and procedures
with the signalling system in order to provide the
service, including the maintenance from
Bombardier and operation from Tram
Operations Ltd (TOL).
Fig. 4 illustrates a part of signalling system at
East Croydon station, which controls the tram
operation on the westbound line. The westbound
line divides at motorised facing points ECR06M,
located 98 metres from the tram stop and east of
Billington Hill road crossing. After these points
the routes run parallel before diverging near the
platforms.
Fig. 3 Schematic diagram of East Croydon
Signalling system (derived from (RAIB 2012))
In its operation, the signalling system first
detects an approaching westbound tram when it
passes over an induction loop (COR07), which is
located in the road surface west of Cherry
Orchard Road crossing, 35 metres in front of
ECR06M points. The signalling system next
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detects the tram, when it arrives in either
platform 3 or platform 2, by induction loops
located at the west end of the platforms (ECR10
and ECR09 respectively). The signalling system
controls points ECR06M by sending a voltage
pulse to the point controller requesting it to
direct trams left towards platform 3, or right
towards platform 2. And the route whether is set
to the left or the right is displayed to the
approaching tram by a points position indicator
(PPI), which is mounted on the same post as the
signal that authorises tram movements across the
points.
Figure 5 shows the architecture of the point
control system which controls the points
ECR06M. The request (voltage pulse) sent from
the signalling system is accepted by the point
controller unless the track circuit (TC) or mass
detector (MD) has responded to the presence of
a tram in the immediate vicinity. But if a tram is
crossing over the points, the point controller will
have locked the points to prevent movement and
the request is ignored. In the case if a second
tram is detected by loop COR07 before the first
tram has reached loop ECR10 (or ECR09)
(which is located at the end of the platform), the
signalling system will store the request to the
point controller, and let the second tram wait in
front of points by showing the traffic signal on
the post of PPI. The stored request will be
released when the first tram is detected by loop
ECR10 (or ECR09).
Fig. 4 Schematic diagram of Point control
system (RAIB 2012)
Apart from the controls from the signalling
system, the TOL also has operating instructions.
It requests, first of all, tram has to be stopped on
loops at platform; and secondly the following
tram has to wait at the PPI until the PPI shows a
route to an unoccupied platform, which can be
either an empty platform or a platform where the
previous tram has started to move away.
4.2 Hazard analysis
There is not enough space to describe the entire
hazard analysis in this paper. In the section, we
will discuss two typical hazards, “there is a
movement of a points when a tram is crossing
over it” and “a tram enters into a platform which
has been occupied by another tram”, in details to
demonstrate the usage of proposed hybrid
system dynamics model.
4.2.1 Hazard I: there is a movement of the points
when a tram is crossing over it
After identifying the causes of the hazard, we
find there will be three root factors, which can
directly trigger the hazardous event happen.
They are “TC fails to detect the tram”, “PM is
out of control”, and “there is an abnormal
behaviour of points controller”. All these factors
are marked with “*” in the hybrid system
dynamics model, shown in Fig 5.
As been discussed that the tram system is a
social-technical system that means apart from
the technical system inside which is the
signalling system, there are business systems of
TOL (the tram operator) and Bombardier
(maintenance) around the technical system.
Therefore it is also important to identify the
causal factors from these social systems during
the analysis.
In the hybrid system dynamics model, these
safety barriers and mitigations from social
sub-systems can be added (in this case study,
they are highlighted in red).
In order to make sure there is no critical
causes unidentified, a fault tree analysis for this
hazard had also been conducted too, shown in
Figure 7. Referencing to the fault tree, it is
clearly shown that the three single point failures
(highlighted in red) have also been identified
in the HSD model. In addition, we can argue that
there is an implicit dependence between “a tram
is crossing over but not detected” and “a tram
slowly crosses the point”. Because of the
mechanism how a track circuit detects a tram,
the slower the tram is moving on the track the
easier the tram is detected, we can address in the
model that the behaviours of driver may
contribute the situation that the tram has not
been detected although it is superficially a fault
in the technical system. And an adequate in TOL
safety management will help.
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Fig. 5 Hybrid system dynamics model of
Hazard I
Fig. 6 Fault tree analysis of Hazard I
4.2.2 Hazard II: Tram enters into a platform
which is occupied by another tram
Same as the analysis of previous hazard, the
HSD model, in Fig. 7 (in appendix), shows that
some faults in the technical system are the root
causes, for example, the errors in the
interlocking algorithm, faults of points and PPI
display. Most importantly, during the analysis of
social system, we identified that there is no fault
in the technical system and driver followed the
TOL’s instruction but there still could be a
hazardous event waiting for happen, in which
scenario that the front tram takes long to arrive
at platform so that the request of new route
setting has been hold, and when the following
tram arrives the PPI/points and the driver sees
the front tram moving towards the end of
platform then he drivers the tram into the route
towards to the same platform. So there is a flow
in the design of TOL’s operating instructions in
terms of system safety that allows the driver
drives the tram through the points without
waiting for the signal if he can see the front tram
leaving. And because that behaviour is designed
in the operating instructions, it cannot be
eliminated by safety measurements from safety
management system.
After the analysis based on hybrid SD model,
we also conducted a FTA (in Fig. 7) to ensure
there is nothing important missed in our
analysis.
4.2.3 Discussion
Modern safety critical systems may consist of
many nonlinear, counterintuitive and dynamic
dependencies. Therefore, although hazards are
identified and analysed individually, it should
have a “seeing the forest through the trees”
approach for the safety assessment. The hybrid
SD model provides the capability to analyse the
complex dependencies among different hazards.
In this case study, based on the model (shown in
Fig. 8), we found that these two hazards are
implicitly interconnected. If the request of route
setting is wrong, then the points may be
requested to move so it is more likely that the
points controller re-acts incorrectly because the
points is an on-demand equipment. And in
addition, if the signal and information on PPI are
wrong, then it is more likely that driver will
drive the tram through the point rather than
waiting for the finish of the points’ movement.
The identification of these cause-and-effect
relationships (highlighted in the model) between
two hazards is important to the safety analysis
because these relationships cannot be addressed
in the fault tree analysis (see Figure 5 and Figure
6 ) so that there is a potential scenario that an
error in the signalling system may propagate to
points control system, and in some circumstance
it emergences in a different form (e.g., the points
control is out of control).
By applying the hybrid SD in the safety
analysis, we can easily see the dependencies of
these two hazards are interconnected: the factors
of one can propagate through this dependency
“map” to activate the other hazard or at least
play an important role in the process of the
evolution of the other hazard.
On Friday 17th February 2012, Tram 2538
was approaching the stop in the westbound
direction. After observing that the PPI for points
ECR06M was displaying the indication to
platform 3, the driver applied power to take the
tram over the points. The leading bogie of Tram
2538 was directed towards platform 3, but the
points moved as the bogie was passing over. As
a consequence of the points moving, the centre
and trailing bogies derailed. The accident has
been investigated and the findings were
published in (RAIB, 2012). In this accident
report, the direct cause of this accident has been
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identified that the track circuit inside of the
points ECR06M did not respond to Tram 2538,
which is the reliability problem of the TC. In our
analysis (Fig 8), it seems that is a single failure
if the TC does not respond to the tram over the
points because it is a normal event that the tram
passes the point. Therefore, there are several
safety mechanisms to prevent it happens,
including activities from social subsystems, for
example adequate inspections and maintenance.
However, we also noticed in our analysis that
the occurrence of the points’ incorrect
movement does not only relate to the reliability
of the point’s but also the frequency of the
demands of points’ movement, which can be a
result of flaws in algorithm of interlocking
systems or inadequate operating instructions. In
this accident, these two, firstly the driver was
allowed to drive the tram through the points
without waiting for the signalling system; and
secondly drivers’ improper operating behaviours
(shortly stop at the platform) had not been
addressed in the safety management system, are
all indirect causal factors, which cannot be easily
identified in the fault tree analysis.
In general, the systems to be analysed become
more and more complex, especially when taking
its social elements into consideration. The
dependencies or the cause-and-effect
relationships among hazardous events cannot be
understood as chains of directly related events.
Therefore, a more powerful analytic technique is
needed to assist to identify the reasons behind
system’s dynamic behaviours in order to operate
the system safely in a systemic manner.
Table 1 Section of hazard analysis log
Hazard: Spurious signals from track circuit
Causes Safety barriers Undesirable
event
Potential
consequence
Severity of
consequence
Parasitic
oscillations
due to flaws in
device design
or improper
installation
Testing before
and after
installation
A train is
“lost” in the
ATC system,
i.e., ATC
loses the
tracking of a
train due to
improper
information
of track
occupancy.
Train
collision on
the affected
section of
tracks
Multiple
fatalities/injures
Environmental
interferences
Electrical/Magn
etic isolation
Regular visual
inspections
Automated
inspections
abnormal
stoppage of
serviceWorn data
cable
Regular visual
inspections
Automated
inspections
… … … … …
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Table 2 Requirements analysis for safety analysis of socio-technical systems
What is needed in the hazard
analysis of a social-technical
system
The capability of traditional techniques (FT,
FMEA, WBG, BBN, etc.) can provide
To capture Boolean
dependencies
Boolean dependencies can be modelled in the
qualitative analysis by using traditional
techniques.
To capture non-deterministic
dependencies
Non-deterministic relationships can be modelled
in quantitative analysis if the probability is
known.
To capture complex
interrelationship.
Information of complex interrelationship cannot
be modelling by using traditional techniques.
Table 3 Dependencies in systems
System Characteristics of the majority of
dependencies
An engineering system, e.g., an
electric locomotive
Boolean and nondeterministic
dependencies.
In the safety assessment of an engineering
system, we always focus on the
prerequisites of an event and their
Boolean relationships.
A human-operated engineering
system, e.g., the train driven by a
driver.
Cognitive and adaptive dependencies.
The safety assessment of these systems
focuses on human factors and human
decision-making process although it is
difficult to understand the exact mental
model of human operators at the moment
of accident.
A “soft” system which consists of
engineering system, human agents
and a social institution
(organisation), e.g., a train control
system
Complex and non-linear dependencies.
Safety engineering in social-technical
system is about improving situations
which are “problematical”
[Checkland,1990], rather than “problem
situations”.
5. Conclusions
In the paper, it has been demonstrated by
examples that the approach based on the hybrid
system dynamic model provides such capability
due to the hybrid system dynamic model allows
both Boolean and non-linear dependencies to be
presented in a single model so that the safety
engineer can have a systemic view of how each
individual causal factor effects the overall
system.
The hybrid system dynamics approach is
complementary to the traditional safety analysis.
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Although the comparison to the fault tree
analysis had been discussed in the case study, it
is not for the purpose of discussing the proposed
approach is prior than the traditional approaches.
The real evaluation of an approach relies on vast
applications of real world cast studies.
Meanwhile, we are also working on the software
tool which can assist the safety analysis of
large-scale complex social-technical systems
when the manual analysis is extremely difficult.
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Fig. 8 Fault tree analysis of Hazard II
